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Abstract
We study comonotonicity of risk measures in terms of the primitives of the theory: accep-
tance sets and eligible assets. We show that comonotonicity cannot be characterized by the
properties of the acceptance set alone and heavily depends on the choice of the eligible asset.
In fact, in many important cases, comonotonicity is only compatible with risk-free eligible
assets. The incompatibility with risky eligible assets is systematic whenever the acceptability
criterion is based on Value at Risk or any convex distortion risk measures such as Expected
Shortfall. These findings show the limitations of the concept of comonotonicity in a world
without risk-free assets and raise questions about the meaning and the role of comonotonicity
within a capital adequacy framework. We also point out some potential traps when using
comonotonicity for “discounted” capital positions.
Keywords: comonotonicity, risk measures, acceptance sets, eligible assets
1 Introduction
The theory of acceptance sets and risk measures occupies an important place in current debates
about solvency regimes in both the insurance and the banking world. A variety of theoretical prop-
erties of risk measures have been studied since the seminal publication by Artzner et al. (1999),
among which the property of comonotonicity has received considerable attention. The connec-
tions between risk measures and comonotonicity were first established by Kusuoka (2001) and
Delbaen (2002) in the mathematical finance literature and by Dhaene et al. (2002) in the actuarial
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literature. We refer to Fo¨llmer and Schied (2011) and the references therein for a comprehensive
treatment of comonotonic risk measures and to Denuit et al. (2005) and McNeil et al. (2015) for a
thorough discussion on comonotonicity with a view towards applications in finance and insurance.1
Capital requirements and the rationale for comonotonicity
To best highlight the message of our paper, we start by introducing the concept of comonotonicity
for risk measures in a rather informal way. Consider a one-period economy and assume that capital
positions—assets net of liabilities—of financial institutions at the terminal date are represented
by random variables belonging to a suitable ordered vector space which, in line with much of
the risk measure literature, we take to be the space L∞ of bounded random variables over a
given probability space. In a capital adequacy context, risk measures are interpreted as capital
requirement rules and are used to determine the amount of capital a company has to hold as a
regulatory buffer against unexpected future losses (we use the term “regulatory” in a loose sense
to encompass any externally or internally imposed requirement). Mathematically, a risk measure
can be represented by a decreasing map ρ : L∞ → R.
We say that a risk measure ρ is comonotonic if it satisfies
ρ(X + Y ) = ρ(X) + ρ(Y )
whenever X and Y are comonotone random variables in L∞, i.e. random variables that, being
increasing functions of a common risk driver, are perfectly positively dependent. The main idea
behind comonotonic risk measures is that merging two comonotone positions X and Y will not
lead to diversification and, hence, the amount of risk capital required for the aggregated position
X + Y should correspond to the sum of the individual capital requirements. This interpretation
is particularly appealing if one requires ρ to be subadditive so that the sum of the individual
capital requirements always constitutes an upper bound for the capital requirement of a diversified
position. This is the standard argument put forward in the literature to argue that comonotonicity
might be a natural and desirable normative requirement in a capital adequacy framework, see e.g.
the section on comonotonic risk measures in Fo¨llmer and Schied (2011).
The actuarial literature on capital adequacy has mainly focused on comonotonicity, especially in
conjunction with subadditivity, to derive approximations and bounds for capital requirements of
aggregated positions. We refer to Dhaene et al. (2002) and to the survey article by Dhaene et
al. (2006) for a detailed presentation of such techniques. Note that, as already pointed out in
Embrechts et al. (2002), the highest capital requirement under a comonotonic risk measure for an
aggregated position with given marginals may not be attained by the comonotonic copula unless
the risk measure is subadditive. We refer to Embrechts et al. (2013) and the references therein for
a study of bounds under Value-at-Risk.
1As said, the focus of this paper will be on comonotonic risk measures in a capital adequacy framework. It
is worth mentioning that comonotonicity has a wide spectrum of applications that we do not cover here. In
particular, comonotonicity has been extensively investigated in the context of optimal risk sharing, decision theory
and insurance pricing. In fact, comonotonicity was originally studied, under different names, precisely in the
context of Pareto optimal allocations. The earliest reference in this respect seems to be Borch (1962). We refer
to Landsberger and Meilijson (1994) and to the more recent contributions by Ludkowski and Ru¨schendorf (2008)
and Carlier et al. (2012) for more information about this line of research. In this framework, comonotonicity
arises as a natural property of “optimal” allocations in the presence of convex risk measures, see e.g. Jouini et
al. (2008) and Filipovic´ and Svindland (2008). Since the fundamental works by Quiggin (1982), Yaari (1987) and
Schmeidler (1989), comonotonicity has become a key ingredient of decision theory beyond the classical paradigm
of expected utility. This line of research has inspired a variety of applications to insurance pricing as documented
in Denneberg (1990), Wang (1996), Wang et al. (1997) and Wang (2000).
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The framework of Artzner, Delbaen, Eber, and Heath
The objective of this paper is to investigate the property of comonotonicity for the prominent class
of risk measures introduced in the paper by Artzner et al. (1999). The fundamental idea in that
paper was to provide an operational definition of risk measures by emphasizing the role of two
basic primitive objects:
• the acceptance set A ⊂ L∞, representing the set of capital positions that are deemed accept-
able from a regulatory perspective, and
• the eligible asset S with price S0 > 0 and payoff S1 ∈ L
∞
+ , representing a liquid financial
asset used to reach acceptability.
The acceptance set plays the role of a capital adequacy test to discriminate between financial insti-
tutions that are adequately capitalized from a regulatory perspective, i.e. whose capital position
belongs to A, and those that are inadequately capitalized, i.e. whose capital position does not
belong to A. If a company does not pass the capital adequacy test, then its management needs to
implement a pre-specified remedial action, namely raising capital and investing it into the eligible
asset, to become acceptable.
The risk measure associated with A and S was defined in the aforementioned paper by setting
ρA,S(X) := inf{m ∈ R | X +
m
S0
S1 ∈ A}, X ∈ L
∞ .
If S is the cash asset so that S0 = S1 = 1, we simply write
ρA(X) := inf{m ∈ R | X +m ∈ A}, X ∈ L
∞ .
When finite, the quantity ρA,S(X) has a very clear operational interpretation. If positive, ρA,S(X)
is the “minimum” amount of capital that, if raised and invested in the eligible asset, makes the
position X acceptable. If negative, −ρA,S(X) is the maximum amount of capital that can be
returned to the owners while retaining acceptability. As discussed in Section 2, in this paper we
rule out the situations where ρA,S is not finitely valued by making suitable assumptions on the
payoff S1.
Note that risk measures of the form ρA,S satisfy the property of S-additivity, i.e.
ρA,S(X + λS1) = ρA,S(X)− λS0
for every position X ∈ L∞ and λ ∈ R. If S is the cash asset, then we speak of cash-additivity.
The central question
As stated above, the central question of this paper is:
How to characterize comonotonicity for risk measures of the form ρA,S?
This question has been addressed in the literature only for the special case of a risk-free eligible
asset, e.g. cash, but not for other more realistic choices. As established in Theorem 2.4, for a risk
measure of the form ρA,S to be comonotonic it is necessary (and sufficient) that the corresponding
cash-additive risk measure ρA is itself comonotonic and coincides with ρA,S (up to a multiple).
Hence, we are in fact asking whether a comonotonic cash-additive risk measure can be additive
with respect to a risky eligible asset. Since, as illustrated by our examples and not surprisingly,
comonotonicity of ρA is not sufficient for ρA,S to be comonotonic, the question is not settled by
the existing literature.
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Comonotonicity beyond risk-free assets
The main contribution of our paper is to provide a full picture on comonotonic risk measures when
the eligible asset is not risk-free. In this sense, our results will clarify the role of comonotonicity
in a world in which no risk-free asset may exist.
We show that risk measures of the form ρA,S can be comonotonic although the eligible asset is
not risk-free, so that our question is meaningful. However, as illustrated by Theorem 2.6 and its
corollaries, comonotonicity turns out to be compatible only with a very limited range of eligible
assets. When applied to concrete examples, the characterization established there shows that
comonotonicity is typically compatible only with eligible assets that are close to being risk-free, i.e.
with payoffs that are constant with sufficiently high probability. As discussed in Corollary 2.8, when
the underlying acceptance set is pointed, the situation becomes more extreme: comonotonicity is
compatible only with risk-free eligible assets. Note that the pointedness condition is far from being
pathological and is satisfied, for example, by acceptance sets based on distortion risk measures such
as Expected Shortfall.
Comonotonicity in a world of “discounted” positions
As observed above, the literature on comonotonic risk measures has focused exclusively on the
cash-additive case. The reason for this focus goes back to the following “discounting” argument
(see the remark after Definition 2.1 in Delbaen (2002) or Remark 2.2 in Fo¨llmer and Schied (2002)),
which suggests that the cash-additive case encompasses more general risk measures. Assume S1 is
bounded away from zero. If we use S as a new nume´raire, then, expressed in the new nume´raire,
a capital position X ∈ L∞ becomes X ′ = X/S1, which is often referred to as the “discounted”
version of X . After the change of nume´raire, the eligible asset “formally” has the look and feel of
the cash asset. Moreover, the acceptance set for “discounted” positions is given by
A′ = {X/S1 | X ∈ A} .
We can now express ρA,S — applied to “undiscounted” positions — in terms of the cash-additive
risk measure ρA′ — applied to “discounted” positions — as follows:
ρA,S(X) = S0ρA′(X
′), X ∈ L∞ .
Note that ρA,S(X) represents a number of units of the original nume´raire and ρA′(X
′) a number
of units of S.
Cash-additive risk measures therefore appear as risk measures either with respect to the cash asset
or with respect to a more general eligible asset but using the eligible asset as a nume´raire. The
study of comonotonic cash-additive risk measures can apply to either of these situations. While for
the former comonotonicity may have a financially meaningful interpretation, this does not seem to
be the case for the latter. The critical issue in this respect is that it is not clear how to interpret
comonotonicity in the “discounted” world once we move back to the “undiscounted” world. Indeed,
note that ρA′ is comonotonic if, and only if, we have
ρA,S(X + Y ) = ρA,S(X) + ρA,S(Y )
whenever X ′ = X/S1 and Y
′ = Y/S1 are comonotone. However, it is easy to verify that X
′
and Y ′ will generally lose their comonotonic relationship once expressed in the original nume´raire.
This is because, intuitively speaking, multiplication with a (nonconstant) random variable, e.g.
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S1, reshuffles the outcomes of X
′ and Y ′ in a way that will typically disrupt their perfect positive
dependence. Not only can X ′ and Y ′ be comonotone while X and Y may be far from being
comonotone, but also X ′ and Y ′ may fail to be comonotone while X and Y are. Moreover,
regardless of what S1 might have been, S
′
1 = 1 becomes comonotone with any random variable
in the “discounted” world. Thus, attaching a financial interpretation to the comonotonicity of a
“discounted” risk measure in terms of the original nume´raire seems to be an impossible undertaking.
The above discussion implies that the comonotonicity of ρA′ is neither implied nor implies the
comonotonicity of ρA,S and highlights, from a different angle, that our results cannot be obtained
from the cash-additive theory by a change of nume´raire. This conclusion reinforces the general
concerns about the cash-additive reduction pointed out in Farkas et al. (2014b). We refer to the
monograph by Vecer (2011) and to the recent work by Herdegen (2014) for a discussion about the
conceptual importance of a nume´raire-independent approach to mathematical finance.
Structure of the paper
In Section 2 we describe the underlying framework and state our main results. In Section 3 we
discuss a variety of examples. Section 4 concludes. All the proofs are relegated to a final Appendix.
2 Risk measures and comonotonicity
In this section we provide a comprehensive study of comonotonicity for the class of risk measures
introduced by Artzner et al. (1999). We refer to Appendix A for a brief review of the main
mathematical notions used below.
Introducing risk measures
We consider a one-period economy with dates t = 0 and t = 1 in which future uncertainty is
modelled by a fixed probability space (Ω,F ,P). The capital of a financial institution at time
1, i.e. the value of the company’s assets net of liabilities, is represented by a random variable
X ∈ L∞ := L∞(Ω,F ,P). We refer to X as being a capital position.
A set A ⊂ L∞ is said to be an acceptance set if it is nonempty, strictly contained in L∞, and
monotone, i.e.
X ∈ A, Y ≥ X =⇒ Y ∈ A
for every X, Y ∈ L∞. The acceptance set A is used to model a capital adequacy test prescribed
by (internal or external) regulators: A company with capital position X is deemed adequately
capitalized from a regulatory perspective if, and only if, X belongs to A. In this sense, A divides
the world of financial institutions into the class of acceptable institutions, i.e. those institutions
that hold enough capital, and unacceptable ones, i.e. those institutions that have to raise capital
to become adequately capitalized.
To make unacceptable capital positions acceptable we allow financial institutions to raise capital
and to invest it in a pre-specified traded asset, the so-called eligible asset. We assume the eligible
asset to be liquid and frictionless so that it can be bought or sold in any quantity and its initial
price is a linear function of the volume traded. In this case, the eligible asset can be represented
by a couple
S = (S0, S1) ∈ R+ × L
∞
+ ,
5
where S0 is its initial price and S1 its terminal payoff. We assume throughout that S0 > 0 and
S1 ≥ ε for some ε > 0. We say that S is risk-free whenever S1 is constant. Otherwise, we speak of
a risky eligible asset.
In this setting, the rule to compute the amount of required capital can be therefore modelled by
the map ρA,S : L
∞ → R defined by setting
ρA,S(X) := inf{m ∈ R | X +
m
S0
S1 ∈ A}, X ∈ L
∞ .
The requirement that S1 be bounded away from zero ensures that ρA,S is indeed finitely valued,
see Farkas et al. (2014a). When the eligible asset is cash, i.e. when S = (1, 1), we simply write ρA
so that
ρA(X) := inf{m ∈ R | X +m ∈ A}, X ∈ L
∞ .
Following Artzner et al. (1999), the functional ρA,S will be called the risk measure associated to A
and S.
As a result of the monotonicity of the acceptance set and the linearity of the pricing rule, the risk
measure ρA,S is easily seen to enjoy the following fundamental properties, which will be freely used
in the sequel; see Artzner et al. (1999) and, for the present setting, Farkas et al. (2014a). Here, we
say that ρ : L∞ → R is S-additive whenever
ρA,S(X + λS1) = ρA,S(X)− λS0
for all X ∈ L∞ and λ ∈ R. If S is the cash asset, then we speak of cash-additivity. Moreover, we
adopt the notation
A(ρ) := {X ∈ L∞ | ρ(X) ≤ 0} .
Proposition 2.1. The risk measure ρA,S satisfies the following properties:
(i) ρA,S is S-additive.
(ii) ρA,S is decreasing.
(iii) A(ρA,S) = A whenever A is closed.
The first property tells us that the worse the capital position, the higher the amount of required
capital. The second property shows that adding the payoff of the eligible asset to a given capital
position has a linear impact on the corresponding capital requirement. The last property establishes
a useful relation between the underlying acceptance set and the risk measure under the assumption
of closedness, which is satisfied in all the relevant examples and will be systematically required in
the sequel.
Characterizing comonotonicity
We start our study of comonotonic risk measures by recalling the notion of comonotonicity. The
terminology was introduced in Schmeidler (1986) and the characterization in terms of a com-
mon risk driver can be found in Denneberg (1994). We refer to the introduction for a financial
interpretation in the context of capital adequacy.
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Definition 2.2. We say that X, Y ∈ L∞ are comonotone whenever there is a P ⊗ P-null set
N ⊂ F ⊗ F such that
(X(ω)−X(ω′))(Y (ω)− Y (ω′)) ≥ 0 for all (ω, ω′) ∈ Ω× Ω \N
This is equivalent to the existence of Z ∈ L∞ and of two increasing functions f, g : R → R
satisfying
X = f(Z) and Y = g(Z) .
A set C ⊂ L∞ is said to be comonotonic if X and Y are comonotone for any choice of X, Y ∈ C.
A functional ρ : L∞ → R is called comonotonic whenever
ρ(X + Y ) = ρ(X) + ρ(Y )
for all comonotone X, Y ∈ L∞.
We start our investigation of comonotonic risk measures of the form ρA,S by highlighting that any
comonotonic decreasing functional can be expressed as the risk measure associated to a closed
conic acceptance set and to a risk-free asset.
Lemma 2.3. Let ρ : L∞ → R be a nonzero comonotonic decreasing map. Then, ρ(1) < 0 and we
have
ρ(X) = ρA(ρ),R(X)
for every X ∈ L∞, where A(ρ) is a closed conic acceptance set and R = (−ρ(1), 1).
Armed with this result we can now provide necessary and sufficient conditions for a risk measure
ρA,S to be comonotonic in terms of properties of the acceptance set and of the eligible asset. First
of all, we show that ρA,S cannot be comonotonic unless the cash-additive risk measure ρA is itself
comonotonic.
Proposition 2.4. Assume A is closed and ρA,S is comonotonic. Then, ρA is comonotonic as well
and we have
ρA,S(X) = ρA,R(X) = −ρA,S(1)ρA(X)
for every X ∈ L∞, where R = (−ρA,S(1), 1).
It follows from from the above result that a necessary condition for the comonotonicity of ρA,S is
that, besides being additive with respect to the eligible asset S, the risk measure ρA,S is also additive
with respect to a particular risk-free asset. In particular, we are naturally led to investigate the
equality of two risk measures ρA,S and ρA,R based on the same acceptance set but different eligible
assets. The following lemma establishes a necessary and sufficient condition for this equality to
hold. Here, we denote by span(X) the linear space generated by X ∈ L∞.
Lemma 2.5. Assume A is closed and consider two eligible assets S = (S0, S1) and R = (R0, R1).
Then, the following statements are equivalent:
(a) ρA,S(X) = ρA,R(X) for every X ∈ L
∞.
(b) A+ span
(
S1
S0
− R1
R0
)
⊂ A.
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We are now in a position to state our first characterization of comonotonicity for risk measures
ρA,S . This result identifies which combinations of acceptance sets and eligible assets give rise
to comonotonicity. In particular, it shows that comonotonicity cannot be characterized by the
properties of the acceptance set alone: Given the same acceptance set, a risk measure ρA,S will be
comonotonic only for special choices of the eligible asset S.
Theorem 2.6. Assume A is closed and ρA is comonotonic. Then, the following statements are
equivalent:
(a) ρA,S is comonotonic.
(b) A± (1 +
ρA,S(1)
S0
S1) ⊂ A.
In particular, ρA,S is comonotonic only if S1 +
S0
ρA,S(1)
∈ A ∩ (−A).
To best interpret condition (b) in the above theorem assume that ρA,S(1) = −1 so that the
condition boils down to
A±
(
1−
S1
S0
)
⊂ A .
This means that acceptability is not compromised once we add to any acceptable position the
payoff of a fully-leveraged portfolio obtained by borrowing at the risk-free rate and going long the
eligible asset or, similarly, by shorting the eligible asset and going long the risk-free asset (assuming
the risk free asset is available in the market). In particular, since 0 ∈ A, we must have
1−
S1
S0
∈ A ,
showing that the payoffs of these fully-leveraged portfolios are themselves acceptable. This high-
lights that comonotonicity for ρA,S corresponds to a property of acceptability, namely the “blind-
ness” of the acceptance set with respect to aggregations of fully-leveraged portfolios, that is far
from being desirable from a regulatory perspective.
We specify the preceding theorem to convex acceptance sets, in which case comonotonicity can be
characterized by means of a simpler condition as follows.
Corollary 2.7. Assume A is closed and convex and ρA is comonotonic. Then, the following
statements are equivalent:
(a) ρA,S is comonotonic.
(b) ±(1 +
ρA,S(1)
S0
S1) ∈ A.
(c) S1 +
S0
ρA,S(1)
∈ A ∩ (−A).
In the setting of the above corollary the set A ∩ (−A) is a linear space whose elements might be
called risk invariants in that the risk measure ρA is not affected once we add them to a given
capital position, i.e.
A ∩ (−A) = {X ∈ L∞ | ρA(X + Y ) = ρA(Y ), Y ∈ L
∞} .
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To see this, note first that A ∩ (−A) is indeed a linear space since A is a convex cone. Then, for
any X ∈ A ∩ (−A) and Y ∈ L∞ we have
ρA(Y ) = ρA(Y +X −X) ≤ ρA(X + Y ) + ρA(−X) ≤ ρA(X + Y ) ≤ ρA(X) + ρA(Y ) ≤ ρA(Y )
by subadditivity of ρA, showing the above representation of A∩ (−A). In this sense, the preceding
result tells us that ρA,S is comonotonic if, and only if, the payoff of the “fully-leveraged” position
S1 +
S0
ρA,S(1)
is a risk invariant.
As a consequence of the preceding corollary we see that, if the acceptance set A satisfies the
pointedness condition
A∩ (−A) = {0} ,
i.e. if there exists no nonzero risk invariant, then a risk measure ρA,S fails to be comonotonic
unless the eligible asset S is risk-free. As will be illustrated by our examples in the next section,
this situation is far from being exceptional. In fact, the vast majority of acceptance sets used in
applications satisfy the above pointedness condition.
Corollary 2.8. Assume A is closed and satisfies A ∩ (−A) = {0}. Then, ρA,S is comonotonic
only if
S1 = −
S0
ρA,S(1)
.
In particular, ρA,S is never comonotonic if S is a risky asset.
A weaker form of comonotonicity
What drives the strong structural results about comonotonic risk measures is the fact that the
constant random variable 1 is comonotone with any random variable. As a result, whenever X
and Y are comonotonic, the set {X, Y, 1} is a comonotonic set. One could then wonder whether
it is possible to obtain a wider spectrum of results by weakening the notion of a comonotonic risk
measure and only require that
ρA,S(X + Y ) = ρA,S(X) + ρA,S(Y )
whenever there is a comonotonic set C such that X, Y, S1 ∈ C. In this case, besides being comono-
tone, X and Y must also be comonotone with S1. This property could be called S-comonotonicity.
The above question has, in fact, a purely mathematical interest. Indeed, being expressed in terms
of a given eligible asset, the above weaker notion of comonotonicity is tailored to risk measures
with respect to that eligible asset. However, the eligible asset is nothing but an instrument to
reach acceptability and there seems to be no way to establish what is the “right” eligible asset to
consider in this context. Anyway, from a purely mathematical perspective, it is not difficult to
see that we arrive at similar constraints on the acceptance set A and the eligible asset S as in the
standard comonotone case. Indeed, an inspection of our results show that they can be localized
to comonotonic sets containing S1. For instance, keeping in mind that 1 is comonotonic with S1,
it follows as in Lemma 2.3 that
ρA,S(X + λ) = ρA,S(X)− λρA,S(−1)
for all λ ∈ R whenever X is comonotone with S1. Moreover, ρA,S must be positively homogeneous
on the cone
U = {X ∈ L∞ | X is comonotone with S1} .
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A straightforward generalization of the preceding results thus shows that, if A is closed, then we
must have
A ∩ U ±
(
1 +
ρA,S(1)
S0
S1
)
⊂ A .
Thus, the condition ρA,S(X+Y ) = ρA,S(X)+ ρA,S(Y ) whenever there is a comonotonic set C such
that X, Y, S1 ∈ C only holds if
S1 +
S0
ρA,S(1)
∈ A ∩ (−A) .
This latter condition is the same as in Theorem 2.6 and implies that S must be risk-free once A
is pointed.
3 Examples
In this final section we illustrate our results by focusing on a variety of explicit acceptance sets.
These examples will make clear that comonotonicity is the exception rather than the rule as soon
as the eligible asset is not risk-free.
Capital adequacy based on Value-at-Risk
The Value-at-Risk (VaR) of a capital position X ∈ L∞ at the level α ∈ (0, 1) is defined by
VaRα(X) := inf{m ∈ R | P(X +m < 0) ≤ α} .
Note that VaRα(X) is, up to a sign, the upper α-quantile of X . The corresponding acceptance set
is the closed cone given by
AVaR(α) := {X ∈ L
∞ | VaRα(X) ≤ 0} = {X ∈ L
∞ | P(X < 0) ≤ α} .
We are interested in studying the comonotonicity of the risk measure S-VaRα : L
∞ → R given by
S-VaRα(X) := ρAVaR(α),S(X) = inf{m ∈ R | P(X +
m
S0
S1 < 0) ≤ α}, X ∈ L
∞ .
Since VaRα is well-known to be comonotonic, one easily sees that S-VaRα will be automatically
comonotonic whenever S is risk-free. In this case, S-VaRα will be, in fact, just a multiple of VaRα.
At the same time, it is not difficult to verify that the acceptance set AVaR(α) is not pointed in
general and, therefore, Corollary 2.8 does not apply to risk measures based on VaR-acceptability.
The first result is derived by applying Theorem 2.6 to VaR-acceptability and shows that S-VaRα
can be comonotonic only if the payoff S1 is constant with sufficiently high probability. Indeed, as
values of α close to 0 are the interesting ones from a practical perspective, the bound given in (3.1)
is close to 1.
Proposition 3.1. Assume S-VaRα is comonotonic. Then, we have
P
(
S1 = −
1
VaRα(1/S1)
)
≥ 1− 2α . (3.1)
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Remark 3.2. Condition (3.1) is generally not sufficient for comonotonicity. To see this, let
{A,B,C} be a measurable partition of Ω such that P(A) = P(B) = α and P(C) = 1 − 2α.
Consider an eligible asset S with S0 > 0 and
S1 =
{
S0 on A ∪ C,
2S0 on B.
It is easy to verify that S-VaRα(1) = −1 and, thus, (3.1) is satisfied. However, since−1A ∈ AVaR(α)
but
−1A +
(
1−
S1
S0
)
= −1A∪B /∈ AVaR(α) ,
then condition (b) in Theorem 2.6 is violated and, hence, S-VaRα is not comonotonic.
In view of the previous result, it is natural to wonder whether comonotonicity is at all compatible
with risky eligible assets. The next proposition characterizes all the underlying probabilistic models
where S-VaRα is comonotonic for some risky eligible asset.
Lemma 3.3. The following statements are equivalent:
(a) There exists a risky eligible asset S such that S-VaRα is comonotonic.
(b) There exists A ∈ F such that 0 < P(A) ≤ α and for every B ∈ F we have
P(B) ≤ α =⇒ P(A) + P(Ac ∩ B) ≤ α .
The preceding result has the following remarkable consequence when specified to the common
setting of a nonatomic probability space, i.e. a probability space that supports random variables
with any prescribed distribution: Risk measures based on VaR-acceptability are never comonotonic
unless the eligible asset is risk-free.
Proposition 3.4. Assume (Ω,F ,P) is nonatomic. Then, S-VaRα is comonotonic if and only if
S is risk-free.
It is well-known that VaRα fails to be subadditive. However, being comonotone, it satisfies
VaRα(X + Y ) = VaRα(X) + VaRα(Y )
for any comonotone X, Y ∈ L∞. This allows to control the capital required for an aggregated
position of comonotone random variables by means of the individual capital requirements. Since
S-VaRα is in general not comonotone if S is a risky asset, one may wonder whether the capital
required for an aggregated position of comonotone random variables can still be controlled in terms
of the individual capital requirements or not. Here, we show that the undesirable situation
S-VaRα(X + Y ) > S-VaRα(X) + S-VaRα(Y )
is possible also for comonotone X, Y ∈ L∞, so that summing up the individual capital require-
ments of comonotone random variables does not help find a bound for the capital required for the
aggregated position.
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We provide an example in the setting of Example 3.2 above. If we consider the comonotone random
variables
X =


−2 on A
−3 on B
2 on C
and Y =


−4 on A
−9 on B
0 on C
,
then it is not difficult to show that
S-VaRα(X + Y ) = 6 >
3
2
+ 4 = S-VaRα(X) + S-VaRα(Y ) .
Capital adequacy based on Expected Shortfall
The Expected Shortfall (ES) of a capital position X ∈ L∞ at the level α ∈ (0, 1) is defined by
ESα(X) :=
1
α
∫ α
0
VaRβ(X) dβ .
The corresponding acceptance set is the closed convex cone defined by
AES(α) := {X ∈ L
∞ | ESα(X) ≤ 0} .
We aim to characterize comonotonicity for the risk measure S-ESα : L
∞ → R given by
S-ESα(X) := ρAES(α),S(X) = inf{m ∈ R | ESα(X +
m
S0
S1) ≤ 0}, X ∈ L
∞ .
We show that risk measures based on ES-acceptability are comonotonic if, and only if, the eligible
asset is risk-free. This result will be a direct consequence of the following lemma.
Lemma 3.5. For every nonconstant X ∈ L∞ we have
ESα(X) > −E[X ] .
The preceding lemma implies that acceptance sets based on ES are pointed and, thus, we are in a
position to apply Corollary 2.8 and conclude that risk measures based on ES-acceptability fail to
be comonotonic unless the eligible asset is risk-free.
Proposition 3.6. The risk measure S-ESα is comonotonic if and only if S is risk-free.
Capital adequacy based on distortion risk measures
We denote by P([0, 1]) the set of all probability measures µ : [0, 1] → [0, 1]. The distortion risk
measure associated to µ ∈ P([0, 1]) is the map DRµ : L
∞ → R defined by
DRµ(X) :=
∫ 1
0
ESα(X)µ(dα) .
Here, as is commonly done, we extend ES by setting
ES0(X) := − inf{m ∈ R | X ≥ m} and ES1(X) := −E[X ] .
12
The corresponding acceptance set is the closed convex cone given by
ADR(µ) := {X ∈ L
∞ | DRµ(X) ≤ 0} .
The class of acceptance sets based on distortion risk measures is huge and includes, in a nonatomic
setting, all the acceptance sets that are convex, law-invariant and compatible with comonotonicity.
This is made precise in the next proposition, which is a direct consequence of Theorem 4.93 in
Fo¨llmer and Schied (2011).
Proposition 3.7. Assume (Ω,F ,P) is nonatomic and A is closed, convex and law-invariant.
Then, the following statements are equivalent:
(a) ρA is comonotonic.
(b) A = ADR(µ) for some µ ∈ P([0, 1]).
Remark 3.8. In a nonatomic setting, distortion risk measures can be equivalently identified, up
to a sign, with Choquet integrals associated with concave distortion functions, see Theorem 4.70
in Fo¨llmer and Schied (2011).
We aim to characterize comonotonicity for the risk measure S-DRµ : L
∞ → R given by
S-DRµ(X) := ρADR(µ),S(X) = inf{m ∈ R | DRµ(X +
m
S0
S1) ≤ 0}, X ∈ L
∞ .
The next proposition shows that distortion-based risk measures are never comonotonic unless they
reduce to standard expectations or the eligible asset is taken to be risk-free.
Proposition 3.9. The risk measure S-DRµ is comonotonic if and only if one of the following
conditions holds:
(i) µ({1}) = 1 (so that DRµ(X) = −E[X ] for all X ∈ L
∞).
(ii) S is risk-free.
4 Conclusions
The preceding discussion and results unveil a variety of pitfalls of the notion of comonotonicity
that have not been highlighted hitherto:
• Comonotonicity typically fails in a world without risk-free assets. Comonotonicity
is compatible with a limited range of eligible assets, which typically need to be close to risk-
free. In fact, for many important acceptance sets — such as those based on distortion risk
measures like Expected Shortfall — comonotonicity is compatible only with risk-free eligible
assets.
• Comonotonicity cannot be expressed in terms of properties of A alone. Differently
from other important properties of risk measures such as convexity, subadditivity, and posi-
tive homogeneity, our results imply that comonotonicity cannot be characterized in terms of
properties of the underlying acceptance set alone but critically depends upon the choice of
the eligible asset. Since the eligible asset is simply a vehicle to ensure acceptability, which is
the key capital adequacy objective, it would seem that, in the context of capital adequacy,
comonotonicity is more an incidental property than a fundamental one.
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• Comonotonicity depends on the underlying nume´raire. The fact that comonotonic-
ity is not preserved by changes of nume´raire implies that requiring comonotonicity for “dis-
counted” risk measures has no clear interpretation in the “undiscounted” setting. This seri-
ously limits the financial interpretability of comonotonicity in a capital adequacy context.
These conclusions qualify the meaning and the role of comonotonicity within a capital adequacy
context when the eligible asset is not risk-free. In particular, the critical dependence of comono-
tonicity on the choice of the underlying nume´raire shows that the assumption of comonotonicity
in a world of “discounted” capital positions is not financially plausible. This seems to suggest that
requiring comonotonicity in a capital adequacy framework may not be as desirable as sometimes
claimed and calls for a critical appraisal of the concept of comonotonicity within a capital adequacy
framework.
A The mathematical setup
Throughout the whole paper we consider a fixed probability space (Ω,F ,P) and equip R with its
canonical Borel measurable structure. A random variable X : Ω→ R is said to be P-almost surely
(a.s.) bounded whenever
‖X‖ := inf{m ∈ R | P(|X| > m) = 0} <∞ .
The constant random variable with value λ ∈ R, which is still denoted by λ, and the indicator
function of an event E ∈ F , denoted by 1E , are examples of bounded random variables. The
equivalence classes of P-a.s. bounded random variables with respect to P-a.s. equality form the
vector space L∞ := L∞(Ω,F ,P). We identify, as is customary, equivalence classes in L∞ with any
of their representatives. The space L∞ is a Banach lattice if equipped with the above norm and
with the partial order
X ≥ Y :⇐⇒ P(X ≥ Y ) = 1 .
The set of positive elements of L∞ is given by
L∞+ := {X ∈ L
∞ | X ≥ 0} .
For any X, Y ∈ L∞ we write X ∼ Y whenever X and Y have the same distribution under P, i.e.
P(X ≤ λ) = P(Y ≤ λ) for all λ ∈ R.
We collect in the next definition a variety of properties of functionals that will be used later on.
Recall that, under positive homogeneity, convexity and subadditivity are equivalent.
Definition A.1. A functional ρ : L∞ → R may satisfy the following properties:
(i) ρ(λX + (1− λ)Y ) ≤ λρ(X) + (1− λ)ρ(Y ) for all λ ∈ [0, 1] and X, Y ∈ L∞ (convexity).
(ii) ρ(λX) = λρ(X) for all λ ∈ R+ and X ∈ L
∞ (positive homogeneity).
(iii) ρ(X + Y ) ≤ ρ(X) + ρ(Y ) for all X, Y ∈ L∞ (subadditivity).
(iv) ρ(X) ≤ ρ(Y ) for all X, Y ∈ L∞ with X ≥ Y (decreasing monotonicity).
(v) |ρ(X)− ρ(Y )| ≤ c‖X − Y ‖ for all X, Y ∈ L∞ and some c ∈ R+ (Lipschitz continuity).
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(vi) ρ(X) = ρ(Y ) for all X, Y ∈ L∞ such that X ∼ Y (law-invariance).
For ease of reference we also collect a number of properties of sets of random variables. Note that,
under conicity, convexity is equivalent to closedness under addition.
Definition A.2. A set A ⊂ L∞ may satisfy the following properties:
(i) λX + (1− λ)Y ∈ A for all λ ∈ [0, 1] and X, Y ∈ A (convexity).
(ii) λX ∈ A for all λ ∈ R+ and X ∈ A (conicity).
(iii) X + Y ∈ A for all X, Y ∈ A (closedness under addition).
(iv) −X /∈ A for all nonzero X ∈ A (pointedness).
(v) X ∈ A for all X ∈ L∞ with X ≥ Y for some Y ∈ A (increasing monotonicity).
(vi) X ∈ A for all X ∈ L∞ such that Xn → X for some (Xn) ⊂ A (closedness).
(vii) X ∈ A for all X ∈ L∞ such that X ∼ Y for some Y ∈ A (law-invariance).
B Proofs
Proof of Lemma 2.3. We easily see that comonotonicity implies ρ(0) = 0 and, hence, ρ(−1) =
−ρ(1). Moreover, we have ρ(1) ≤ 0 by monotonicity. We claim that ρ(1) < 0 holds. To prove this,
assume that ρ(1) = 0 and take X ∈ L∞. Since 1 is comonotone with itself and a ≥ X ≥ −a for
a ∈ N large enough, we obtain
0 = aρ(1) = ρ(a) ≤ ρ(X) ≤ ρ(−a) = aρ(−1) = 0 ,
which is only possible if ρ is the zero functional. In conclusion, we see that ρ(1) < 0 must hold.
It follows from the monotonicity of ρ that A is an acceptance set. Closedness and conicity will
follow once we show that ρ is Lipschitz continuous and positively homogeneous, respectively. To
this end, take first an arbitrary X ∈ L∞ and two integers a, b ∈ N. Since every random variable is
comonotone with itself we have
ρ(a
b
X) = aρ(1
b
X) = a
b
ρ(b1
b
X) = a
b
ρ(X) .
As a result, for every rational number λ ∈ Q it follows that
ρ(X + λ) = ρ(X) + ρ(λ) = ρ(X)− λρ(−1) ,
where we used that λ is comonotone with X and that ρ(−1) = −ρ(1).
Take now an arbitrary λ ∈ R and let (λ+n ) and (λ
−
n ) be sequences of rational numbers converging
to λ from above and below, respectively. Using the monotonicity of ρ we finally obtain
ρ(X)− λ+n ρ(−1) = ρ(X + λ
+
n ) ≤ ρ(X + λ) ≤ ρ(X + λ
−
n ) = ρ(X)− λ
−
n ρ(−1)
for any n ∈ N. By letting n tend to infinity, we conclude that ρ(X + λ) = ρ(X) − λρ(−1) must
hold. Since, setting S = (−ρ(1), 1), the condition X + m
S0
S1 ∈ A(ρ) is then easily seen to be
equivalent to ρ(X) ≤ m for any m ∈ R, we easily see that
ρ(X) = inf{m ∈ R | X + m
S0
S1 ∈ A(ρ)} = ρA(ρ),S(X) . (B.1)
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We have already established positive homogeneity for positive rational numbers. Take now a
strictly-positive λ ∈ R+ and let (λ
+
n ) and (λ
−
n ) be sequences of positive rational numbers converging
to λ from above and below, respectively. In view of (B.1) we can assume that X ∈ L∞+ without
loss of generality. Then, the monotonicity of ρ yields
λ+n ρ(X) = ρ(λ
+
nX) ≤ ρ(λX) ≤ ρ(λ
−
nX) = λ
−
n ρ(X)
for every n ∈ N. Letting n go to infinity, we conclude that ρ(λX) = λρ(X). This proves positive
homogeneity.
Since Y − ‖X − Y ‖ ≤ X ≤ Y + ‖X − Y ‖ for any X, Y ∈ L∞, it follows immediately from
monotonicity and (B.1) that
ρ(Y ) + ‖X − Y ‖ρ(−1) ≥ ρ(X) ≥ ρ(Y )− ‖X − Y ‖ρ(−1) ,
which shows that ρ is Lipschitz continuous. This concludes the proof of the proposition.
Remark B.1. An alternative way to establish the previous lemma is to rely on the representation
theorem in Schmeidler (1986) and derive the above properties of ρ from the properties of Choquet
integrals, see e.g. Proposition 5.1 in Denneberg (1994). The above proof has the advantage of
being direct and of showing explicitly the role of each of our assumptions.
Proof of Proposition 2.4. Recall from Proposition 2.1 that A(ρA,S) = A since A is closed.
Hence, Lemma 2.3 implies that
ρA,S(X) = ρA,R(X) = inf{m ∈ R | X −
m
ρA,S(1)
∈ A} = −ρA,S(1)ρA(X)
for all X ∈ L∞. This also shows that ρA is comonotonic.
Proof of Lemma 2.5. To prove that (a) implies (b), assume that ρA,S = ρA,R. Then, for any
X ∈ L∞ and m ∈ R we have
ρA,S
(
X +m(S1
S0
− R1
R0
)
)
= ρA,S(X) ,
where we used that ρA,S is additive with respect to both S and R by assumption. The assertion
now follows from A(ρA,S) = A.
To prove the converse implication, take X ∈ L∞ and assume that (b) holds. If X + m
S0
S1 ∈ A for
some m ∈ R, then we easily see that
X + m
R0
R1 = X +
m
S0
S1 −m(
S1
S0
− R1
R0
) ∈ A
as well. This implies that ρA,R(X) ≤ ρA,S(X). Since the argument is symmetric in S and R, we
conclude that ρA,S = ρA,R.
Remark B.2. The above lemma could be derived from Proposition 5.1 in Farkas et al. (2014a),
see also Proposition 1-a in Artzner et al. (2009) in a convex setting. We have provided a short
proof for the sake of completeness.
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Proof of Theorem 2.6. First, assume that (a) holds so that ρA,S is comonotonic. Then, by
Proposition 2.4, we have
ρA,S(X) = −ρA,S(1)ρA(X) = ρA,R(X)
for every X ∈ L∞, where R = (−ρA,S(1), 1). Hence, Lemma 2.5 immediately yields (b).
Conversely, assume that (b) holds. As ρA is comonotonic, A must be conic by Lemma 2.3. More-
over, note that ρA,S(1) < 0 by virtue of the same lemma. Since condition (b) is then easily seen
to be equivalent to
A+ span(S1
S0
− 1
−ρA,S(1)
) ⊂ A ,
we can rely on Lemma 2.5 to conclude that ρA,S coincides, up to the constant −ρA,S(1), with
the comonotonic risk measure ρA and is therefore itself comonotonic. This establishes (a) and
concludes the proof of the equivalence. The last assertion follows immediately because 0 ∈ A by
conicity.
Proof of Corollary 2.7. Since 0 ∈ A by conicity, it follows directly from Theorem 2.6 that
(a) implies (b). To prove the converse implication, assume that (b) holds and take an arbitrary
X ∈ A. Since, being convex and conic, A is closed under addition, we infer from (b) that
X±(1+
ρA,S(1)
S0
S1) ∈ A. That ρA,S is comonotonic now follows from Theorem 2.6. The equivalence
between (b) and (c) is a direct consequence of conicity.
Proof of Proposition 3.1. Since 0 ∈ AVaR(α), it follows from Theorem 2.6 that S-VaRα can be
comonotonic only if
P(1 + S-VaRα(1)
S0
S1 < 0) ≤ α and P(−1−
S-VaRα(1)
S0
S1 < 0) ≤ α . (B.2)
By rearranging, the above inequalities are easily seen to imply
P(S1 = −
1
VaRα(1/S1)
) = 1− P(S1 < −
1
VaRα(1/S1)
)− P(S1 > −
1
VaRα(1/S1)
) ≥ 1− 2α ,
where we used that S-VaRα(1) = S0VaRα(1/S1).
Proof of Lemma 3.3. To prove that (a) implies (b), assume that S-VaRα is comonotonic for
some eligible asset S with nonconstant payoff S1. Consider the random variable
Z = 1 + S-VaRα(1)
S0
S1
and note that, by (B.2), it satisfies
max{P(Z < 0),P(Z > 0)} ≤ α .
Since Z is nonconstant, one of the above probabilities must be strictly positive. Without loss of
generality, assume that P(Z < 0) > 0 and set
A = {Z < 0} ∈ F .
Now, take any B ∈ F satisfying P(B) ≤ α. Since −1B ∈ AVaR(α), Theorem 2.6 implies that Z−1B
must belong to AVaR(α) so that P(Z < 1B) ≤ α. Note that P(Z < 1) = 1 because S-VaRα(1) < 0.
Then, it is easy to see that
P(A) + P(Ac ∩ B) = P(A ∪ (Ac ∩B)) ≤ P(Z < 1B) ≤ α .
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Hence, (a) implies (b).
To prove the converse implication, assume that (b) holds and define the eligible asset S by setting
S0 = 1 and
S1 =
{
1 on Ac,
2 on A.
Moreover, consider the random variable
Z = 1 + S-VaRα(1)
S0
S1 .
It is easy to verify that S-VaRα(1) = −1 so that Z = −1A. Take now an arbitrary X ∈ AVaR(α).
By applying (b) to B = {X < 0} we obtain
P(X + Z < 0) = P(A ∩ {X < 1A}) + P(A
c ∩ {X < 1A}) ≤ P(A) + P(A
c ∩ {X < 0}) ≤ α .
In addition, we easily see that
P(X − Z < 0) = P(X < −1A) ≤ P(X < 0) ≤ α .
As a result, Theorem 2.6 implies that S-VaRα is comonotonic and we conclude that (b) implies
(a). This completes the proof of the equivalence.
Proof of Proposition 3.4. The “if” implication is always true. To prove the “only if” implication,
it suffices to note that condition (b) in Lemma 3.3 is never satisfied in a nonatomic setting. Indeed,
if P(A) ≤ α, then we can always find B ∈ F such that B ⊂ Ac and α − P(A) < P(B) < α by
nonatomicity. Since we easily have
P(A) + P(Ac ∩ B) = P(A) + P(B) > α ,
Lemma 3.3 tells us that S-VaRα can be comonotonic only if S1 is constant.
Proof of Lemma 3.5. Since, for given X ∈ L∞, we have that VaRβ(X) is decreasing as a function
of β, it follows that
ESα(X)−
∫ α
0
VaRβ(X) dβ =
1− α
α
∫ α
0
VaRβ(X) dβ ≥ (1− α) VaRα(X) ≥
∫ 1
α
VaRβ(X) dβ ,
with equality between the left- and the right-hand side if and only if VaRβ(X) = VaRα(X) for all
β ∈ (0, 1) or, equivalently, if and only if X is constant. Hence, by rearranging, we obtain
ESα(X) ≥
∫ α
0
VaRβ(X) dβ +
∫ 1
α
VaRβ(X) dβ =
∫ 1
0
VaRβ(X) dβ = −E[X ] ,
with equality if and only if X is constant.
Proof of Proposition 3.6. The “if” implication is clear since S-ESα is simply a multiple of ESα
in this case and ESα is well known to be comonotonic. To prove the “only if” implication, note
that
ESα(X) + ESα(−X) > −E[X ] + E[X ] = 0 (B.3)
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holds for every nonconstant X ∈ L∞ by Lemma 3.5. As a result, it follows that the acceptance
set AES(α) satisfies the pointedness condition
AES(α) ∩ (−AES(α)) = {0} .
To see this, assume that X ∈ AES(α) ∩ (−AES(α)) so that ESα(X) ≤ 0 and ESα(−X) ≤ 0 both
hold. Since ESα(X) + ESα(−X) ≤ 0, it follows from (B.3) that X must be constant. However,
the only constant random variable belonging to AES(α) ∩ (−AES(α)) is clearly the zero random
variable. In conclusion, AES(α) is pointed and Corollary 2.8 implies that S-ESα is comonotonic
only if S is risk-free.
Proof of Proposition 3.9. The “if” implication is clear since under any of the two conditions the
risk measure S-DRµ is simply a multiple of DRµ, which is comonotonic. In particular, if µ(1) = 1,
then we clearly have DRµ(X) = −E[X ] for any X ∈ L
∞ so that
S-DRµ(X) = inf{m ∈ R | E[X +
m
S0
S1] ≥ 0} = −
S0
E[S1]
E[X ] = S0
E[S1]
DRµ(X)
for all X ∈ L∞. To prove the “only if” implication, assume that S-DRµ is comonotonic but
µ({1}) < 1. Then, it follows from Lemma 3.5 that any nonconstant X ∈ L∞ satisfies DRµ(X) >
−E[X ] and therefore
DRµ(X) + DRµ(−X) > −E[X ] + E[X ] = 0 .
As in the proof of Proposition 3.6, this yields the pointedness condition
ADR(µ) ∩ (−ADR(µ)) = {0} .
Hence, we can apply Corollary 2.8 and conclude that S must be risk-free. This completes the proof
of the “only if” implication.
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